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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Johnny Wayne Phelps was convicted, following a jury trial, of one count of felony 
domestic battery. On appeal, Mr. Phelps contends that the district court erred in 
admitting hearsay statements made during a videotaped interview between law 
enforcement and the alleged victim. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
On the afternoon of April 1, 2013, Mr. Phelps and his girlfriend, Robyn Marshall, 
got into an altercation. (Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSl),1 p.84.) 
Mr. Phelps and Ms. Marshall were arguing when Ms. Marshall grabbed Mr. Phelps' hair 
and, in so doing, jabbed Mr. Phelps in the eye, after which he pushed her and her head 
hit the bathroom mirror. (Trial Tr., p.172, Ls.9-11, p.277, L.18 - p.278, L.10.) Based on 
these facts, Mr. Phelps was charged by information with felony domestic battery by 
inflicting a traumatic injury. (R., pp.38-39.) 
At the jury trial in this case, the State presented the testimony of several 
witnesses, including the testimony of Officer Daniel Koontz, the officer who interviewed 
Ms. Marshall after the incident. (Trial Tr., p.178, L.11 - p.209, L.1.) Officer Koontz 
testified that at 7: 18 p.m., law enforcement was contacted regarding a report of a 
battery. (Trial Tr., p.183, Ls.2-15.) At 7:28 p.m., he was dispatched to a local bar 
located a short distance from the police station. (Trial Tr., p.180, Ls.13-21, p.183, L.13.) 
When the officer arrived at the bar, he spoke to Robyn Marshall. (Trial Tr., p.181, Ls.1-
5.) Ms. Marshall appeared to be intoxicated and told the officers that Mr. Phelps hit her 
1 The designation "PSI" includes all of the electronic records filed under seal in addition 
to the presentencing investigation report. 
1 
in the head four times and kicked her in the face and pushed her head into a mirror. 
(Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit 13.) Ms. Marshall had a small cut on her head and a swollen lip. 
(Trial Tr., p.247, L.23 - p.248, L.6, p.252, Ls.4-10.) 
Over the objections of Mr. Phelps' attorney, the State was permitted to play a 
video of Ms. Marshall being interviewed by law enforcement. (Trial Tr., p.94, L.1 -
p.116, L.6, p.188, L.12 - p.192, L.24, p.198, L.8.) The district court found that the 
hearsay statements therein qualified as either excited utterances, present sense 
impressions, then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition, or statements made 
for purposes of medical treatment, and thus fell within exceptions to the prohibition 
against hearsay contained in the rules of evidence, I.R.E. 803(1 )-(4 ). (Trial Tr., p.189, 
L.11 - p.192, L.24.) 
After the State rested, the defense called Jason Kelly, an emergency medical 
technician who had responded to the scene. (Trial Tr., p.241, L.12 - p.244 L.17.) 
Mr. Kelly testified that he arrived on scene after law enforcement. (Trial Tr., p.244, 
Ls.18-20.) He described the injuries as "fairly minor" and noted that the blood on 
Ms. Marshall was dry. (Trial Tr., p.247, L.23 - p.248, L.6, p.260, L.18.) In fact, he had 
to moisten the injury with saline in order to clean out the wound. (Trial Tr., p.246, Ls.21-
22, p.260, Ls.16-25.) He also recalled that Ms. Marshall refused to be transported for 
further medical treatment. (Trial Tr., p.254, Ls.15-17.) 
Finally, Mr. Phelps testified that he acted in self-defense, as Ms. Marshall first 
pulled his hair and struck him in the eye, though she knew he had recently had eye 
surgery. (Trial Tr., p.18, L.10- p.279, L.19.) 
The jury convicted Mr. Phelps of felony domestic battery. (Trial Tr., p.326, Ls.18-
24; R., p.138.) 
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The district court ordered a PSI and a domestic violence evaluation and set the 
matter for a sentencing hearing. (Trial Tr., p.328, L.7 - p. 329, L.1 · , p.139.) 
Mr. Phelps was sentenced on November 25, 2013. (R., pp.143-148.) The 
district court sentenced Mr. Phelps to four years, with two years fixed, but suspended 
the sentence and placed Mr. Phelps on probation for two and one-half years. (R., 
pp.145-148.) 








The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Admitting Robyn Marshall's Hearsay 
Statements Contained In A Videotaped Interview As The Statements Did Not Fall Under 
Any Exception To The Hearsay Rule 
A Introduction 
The district court erred in admitting the hearsay statements contained in the 
videotaped interview of Ms. Marshall, because the remarks occurred more than fifteen 
minutes after the incident, the comments were made in response to questions asked to 
Ms. Marshall by law enforcement, and were not made for purposes of medical 
treatment. Further, Ms. Marshall had substantial time to reflect on the accident, and 
made the remarks with the goal of ensuring Mr. Phelps was prosecuted. 
B. The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Admitting Robyn Marshall's Hearsay 
Statements Contained In The Videotaped Police Interview 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 801 (c) defines hearsay as "a statement, other than one 
made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to 
prove the truth of the matter asserted." Under Idaho Rule of Evidence (I.R.E.) 802, 
hearsay is inadmissible except as provided by the Rules of Evidence. 
Prior to trial, the State filed a motion in limine, seeking to introduce the hearsay 
statements contained in the videotaped interview of Ms. Marshall. (R., pp. 64-66.) The 
State sought to introduce the statements under the hearsay exceptions provided in 
1.R.E. 803(1 )-(4). (R., pp.64-66.) Shortly after voir dire, the district court heard the 
arguments of counsel regarding the motion, discussed the evidentiary basis for the 
motion, and made several observations, but ultimately declined to rule on the motion 
until after the State laid a foundation for the videotape. (Trial Tr., p.93, L.24 - p.116, 
L.6.) During the testimony of Officer Koontz, the State laid foundation for the videotape 
and sought to have it admitted. (Trial Tr., p.185, Ls.10-19, p.187, L.17 - p.188, L.16.) 
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The district court ruled the statements contained on the tape, in their entirety, were 
admissible. (Trial Tr., p.189, L.3- p.193, L.7.) 
1. The Videotaped Hearsay Statements Were Not Admissible As Excited 
Utterances 
During the testimony of Officer Daniel Koontz, the State sought to introduce a 
video of his interview of Ms. Marshall following the incident. (Trial Tr., p.188, Ls.12-16.) 
Defense counsel objected as the statements contained within the video were hearsay 
(Trial Tr., p.189, Ls.7-10), but the district court found that where the officer arrived 
quickly to the bar where Ms. Marshall was located because the police station was such 
a short distance to the bar, the statements were recorded almost immediately in 
connection with the event and, therefore, admissible under the "excited utterance" 
exception to the hearsay rules (Trial Tr., p.192, Ls.14-24).2 
However, the hearsay statements were not excited utterances as they were 
made well over 10 minutes after the incident, they were made in response to police 
questioning, and Ms. Marshall had substantial time to reflect and come to the 
conclusion that she wanted to see Mr. Phelps prosecuted. 
Pursuant to I.R.E. 803(2), a "statement relating to a startling event or condition 
made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or 
condition" may be admitted under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay 
rule. I.R.E. 803(2). In order to fall within this exception, there must be a startling event 
2 It is not entirely clear from the district court's ruling whether the court was admitting the 
statements solely as "excited utterances" or whether it was admitting them in some 
combination of hearsay exceptions as discussed during the hearing on the State's 
motion in Ii mine just prior to the start of trial. (Trial Tr., p.94, L.1 - p.116, L.6, p.189, 
L.11 - p.192, L.24.) Because the district court referenced only the "excited utterance" 
exception by name, Mr. Phelps will address first the excited utterance exception, 
followed by the alternate bases argued by the State. 
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which renders inoperative the normal reflective thought process of the observer, and the 
declarant's statement must be a spontaneous reaction to that event rather than the 
result of reflective thought. State v. Parker, 112 Idaho 1, 4 (1986); State v. Doe, 140 
Idaho 873, 876 (Ct. App. 2004 ); State v. Hansen, 133 Idaho 323, 325 (Ct. App. 1999). 
In State v. Griffith, the Idaho Court of Appeals noted: 
In considering whether a statement constitutes an excited utterance, the 
totality of the circumstances must be considered, including the nature of 
the startling condition or event, the amount of time that elapsed between 
the event and the statement, the age and condition of the declarant, the 
presence or absence of self-interest, and whether the statement was 
volunteered or made in response to a question. 
State v. Griffith, 144 Idaho 356, 362-63 (Ct. App. 2007) (internal citation omitted). 
Further, whether to admit a statement as an excited utterance is committed to the trial 
court's discretion, State v. Bingham, 116 Idaho 415, 421 (1989); Doe, 140 Idaho at 876, 
and that decision will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion. Id. 
at 877. 
In State v. Burton, 115 Idaho 1154 (Ct. App. 1989), the Idaho Court of Appeals 
held that the district court did not err in excluding evidence offered by defense counsel 
under the "excited utterance" exception to the hearsay rule when there was a five-
minute interval between the end of the declarant/defendant's fight with the victims and 
the making of the statements. Burton involved an altercation between the defendant, 
his son, and the victims at a bar, and the defendant had shot the two victims with a 
pistol. Id. at 1155. The defendant was charged with aggravated battery. Id. When 
the State called the defendant's son as a witness at trial, he attempted to repeat to the 
jury a remark the defendant had made to him as they drove away from the bar. Id. 
The defendant's son attempted to quote the defendant as saying, "'I had to shoot 
them. They were going to rat-pack us. I had to do it for you."' Id. However, the 
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district court determined that the statement was inadmissible hearsay. Id. In affirming 
the defendant's conviction, the Court of Appeals noted that the "excited utterance" 
exception to the hearsay rule "has two requirements. First there must be a startling 
event which renders inoperative the normal reflective thought processes of the 
observer. Second, the declarant's statement must be a spontaneous reaction to that 
event rather than the result of reflective thought." Id. at 1156. The Court of Appeals 
stated that the district court found that the second requirement had not been met, noting 
that: (1) the statement was detached by time and distance from the events; and (2) the 
statement was self-serving. Id. Therefore, the circumstances did not point to any 
"'special reliability'" that would entitle the defendant's statement to be admitted under 
1.R. 803(2). Id. 
In State v. Hansen, 133 Idaho 323 (Ct. App. 1999), the Idaho Court of Appeals 
held that the district court committed error in admitting the declarant/victim's remarks 
through the testimony of a police officer, because the remarks were not "excited 
utterances," when there was a ten-minute interval between the end of the declarant's 
fight with the defendant and making the statements. Hansen involved a confrontation 
between the declarant and her boyfriend, and the declarant reported to the police that 
the boyfriend pushed the declarant into her house, smashed furniture, repeatedly 
pushed the declarant onto the couch, and kicked items out of her hands. Id. at 
327. The boyfriend was charged with battery. Id. at 324. The Court noted that in 
determining whether a statement falls within the excited utterance exception: 
[t]he circumstances to be considered include the amount of time that 
elapsed between the startling event and the statement, the nature of the 
condition or event, the age and condition of the declarant, the presence or 
absence of self-interest, and whether the statement was volunteered or 
made in response to a question. 
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Id. at 325. 
The Hansen Court explained the importance of time in an excited utterance 
hearsay exception analysis, but distinguished the line of cases in which the period of 
time was liberally construed: 
We are cognizant that in a number of cases, the appellate courts of this 
state have affirmed the admission, as excited utterances, of out-of-court 
statements made after a much greater lapse of time from the startling 
event. See Parker, supra; State v. Bingham, 116 Idaho 415, 776 P.2d 424 
(1989); State v. Kay, 129 Idaho 507, 927 P.2d 897 (Ct.App.1996); 
Valverde, supra; State v. Parkinson, 128 Idaho 29, 909 P.2d 647 
(Ct.App.1996); Stover, supra; State v. Peite, 122 Idaho 809, 839 P.2d 
1223 (Ct.App.1992). However, the excited utterances in those cases all 
fell within the discrete category of statements made by sexual assault 
victims regarding their rape or molestation, and the decisions themselves 
acknowledge that the excited utterance exception is given more liberal 
application in that circumstance. 
Hansen, 133 Idaho at 326. The Court also noted that all but one of the cases involved 
child victims. Id. at n.2. In vacating the judgment of conviction and remanding the case 
for a new trial, the Court primarily reasoned that: (1) the ten minute gap between the 
conclusion of the delcarant's fight with the defendant and her arrival at the police station 
was sufficient time for reflective thought and fabrication; (2) the declarant's anger with 
the defendant could have provided an incentive to concoct or embellish her description 
of the confrontation to the police officer; (3) the statements were not an expletive or 
burst of words in abrupt response to a shocking event, but an extensive narration of the 
fight; and (4) the declarant was not a child, but rather an adult woman. Id. at 326-27. 
Therefore, the statements did not carry the indicia of reliability envisioned by I.RE. 
803(2). Id. at 326. 
Between the time of the incident and the time Ms. Marshall was interviewed by 
law enforcement, Ms. Marshall had left the house, gone into the back area of the bar, 
and had called 911. (Trial Tr., p.146, L.19 - p.149, L.20.) Ms. Marshall testified that it 
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was approximately five minutes from the time she left the house to the time she arrived 
the bar and the bartender called 911. (Trial Tr., p.148, L.21 - p.149, L.2.) Officer 
Koontz testified that the call came in to police dispatch at 9:18 p.m., and he was 
dispatched from the police station at 9:28 p.m. (Trial Tr., p.183, Ls.13-15.) Although he 
testified that it was only a short distance down the street to the bar, approximately 
fifteen minutes had elapsed from the time Ms. Marshall left the house and the time 
Officer Koontz left the police station to go to the bar. As the Hansen Court held, a ten-
minute interval between the conclusion of the altercation and the victim's arrival at the 
police station was sufficient time for reflective thought and fabrication. 133 Idaho at 
326. Here, it had been over 15 minutes from the time of the incident to the time the 
officer arrived at the bar to interview Ms. Marshall. Further, the time period may not be 
liberally construed where this case does not concern sexual assault and Ms. Marshall is 
not a child. 
Additionally, like the accuser in Hansen, Ms. Marshall was no longer in the house 
where the incident occurred. Thus the statement was detached both by time and by 
distance from the incident. Moreover, Officer Koontz interviewed Ms. Marshall for well 
over ten minutes, so the comments towards the end of the video are as far removed as 
20 to 25 minutes from the time she first arrived at the bar. Thus Ms. Marshall's 
statements were sufficiently separated in both time and location from the incident such 
that they were not contemporaneous. 
Here, the vast majority of the statements were not volunteered or unprompted, 
but were made in response to questions from law enforcement. (Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit 
No. 13.) The State conceded that "[e]verything she says in that video is in response to 
questions." (Trial Tr., p.103, Ls.22-23.) 
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Additionally, the statements made by Ms. Marshall were self-serving. See 
Burton, 115 Idaho at 1156. Like the declarant in Hansen, she was mad at Mr. Phelps, 
and she wanted him prosecuted. (Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit No. 13.) Towards the 
conclusion of the interview, Ms. Marshall said, "He needs to be arrested and he needs 
to go to jail." (Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit No. 13.) Additionally, the district court failed to 
consider that the statements were made by someone who admitted to committing a 
battery on Mr. Phelps. (Trial Tr., p.142, L.11-12.). Finally, the videotaped statements 
made by Ms. Marshall were inconsistent with her testimony at trial. She recanted 
several of her videotaped statements. For example, in the video, she claimed that 
Mr. Phelps kicked her in the face four times, yet, at trial she testified that Mr. Phelps did 
not kick her at all, thus further underscoring the unreliable nature of the videotaped 
statements. (Trial Tr., p.171, Ls.18-24.) 
Thus, Ms. Marshall's statements were not a spontaneous reaction to the incident, 
but were the result of reflective thought. Here, like the statement in Hansen, 
Ms. Marshall had sufficient time after the incident for reflective thought and fabrication. 
Notably, Ms. Marshall told the officer that she wanted Mr. Phelps to go to jail for his 
conduct, and apparently was aware that she should appear blameless such that she felt 
the need to tell the officers that she "didn't do [any]thing wrong." (Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit 
No. 13.) Since Ms. Marshall had ample time to reflect and consider that her ex-
boyfriend would be prosecuted for his role in the incident, she also had sufficient time to 
reflect on the incident such that the statements were clearly not "excited utterances." 
The circumstances in this case do not indicate any '"special reliability"' about 
Ms. Marshall's statements such that they would be admissible under I.RE. 803(2). 
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Consequently, the district court erred in admitting the statements as "excited 
utterances." 
2. The Videotaped Hearsay Statements Were Not Admissible As Present 
Sense Impressions 
The videotaped hearsay statements of Ms. Marshall were not admissible as 
present sense impressions under I.R.E. 803(1 ). Mr. Phelps asserts that this hearsay 
exception is inapplicable to the statements at issue. 
1.R.E. 803(1) provides that a hearsay statement will not be excluded if it is "a 
statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while the declarant was 
perceiving the event or condition, or immediately thereafter." I.R.E. 803(1 ). "The 
rationale underlying this exception is that, 'substantial contemporaneity of event and 
statement negative the likelihood of deliberate or conscious misrepresentation."' 
State v. Woodbury, 127 Idaho 757, 762 (Ct. App. 1995) (Lansing, J., concurring) 
(quoting REPORT OF IDAHO STATE BAR EVIDENCE COMMITTEE, C 803, p. 2, 
quoting FED. ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTES TO F.R.E. 803(1 ).) 
Here, as discussed in subsection 1, the statements were not made while 
Ms. Marshall was experiencing the incident, but were made approximately fifteen to 
twenty-five minutes after the incident, in a different location. Thus, the statements made 
were not contemporaneous with the event such that the likelihood of misrepresentation 
would be negated. 
3. The Videotaped Hearsay Statements Were Not Admissible As Statements 
Made As To The Then Existing Mental, Emotional, Or Physical Condition 
Of The Declarant 
The videotaped hearsay statements of Ms. Marshall were not admissible as 
statements made as to the then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition of 
Ms. Marshall under I.R.E. 803(3). 
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Idaho Rule of Evidence 803(3), commonly referred to as the "state of mind" 
hearsay exception provides, in relevant part: 
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the 
declarant is available as a witness. 
(3) Then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition. A statement of 
the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical 
condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and 
bodily health), but not including a statementf memory or belief to prove the 
fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation, 
identification, or terms of declarant's will. 
I.RE. 803. 'The rationale for the Rule 803(3) hearsay exception is that the element of 
contemporaneity provides some assurance against fabrication." Herrick v. Leuzinger, 
127 Idaho 293, 301 (Ct. App. 1995) (citation omitted). 
Idaho Rules of evidence 803(1 ), 803(2), and 803(3) codify the three common law 
"spontaneous statement" hearsay exceptions. 2 McCormick on Evidence § 267-270, 
273 (Kenneth S. Broun ed.) (6th ed. 2006). That is, statements that do not describe a 
then-existing mental, emotional or physical condition are not admissible under the rule. 
State v. Gray, 129 Idaho 784, 795 (Ct. App. 1997). 
Here, the majority of Ms. Marshall's videotaped statements recalled past events, 
and were not describing a then existing condition. (Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit No. 13.) 
Further, the statements were made approximately 15 to 25 minutes after the incident, 
thus any "condition" was not contemporaneous with the event. (Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit 
No. 13.) 
Because Ms. Marshall's videotaped statements were not contemporaneous, as 
discussed in subsection 1, they were not admissible as statements made to the then 
existing mental, emotional, or physical condition of Ms. Marshall. 
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4. The Videotaped Hearsay Statements Were Not Admissible As Statements 
Made For Purposes Of Medical Treatment 
The videotaped hearsay statements of Ms. Marshall were not statements made 
for purposes of medical treatment under I.R.E. 803(4 ). Mr. Phelps asserts that this 
hearsay exception is inapplicable to the statements at issue. The questions 
Ms. Marshall was responding to were the questions of the police officer, not the medical 
care providers. (Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit No. 13.) She was not describing to the EMTs at 
the scene how she came by her injuries, but instead was responding to a police officer's 
questions regarding the incident; thus the statements made for purposes of medical 
diagnosis hearsay exception is inapplicable. 
5. The Videotaped Hearsay Statements VVere Not Admissible Under The 
Residual, "Catch-All" Hearsay Exception, I.R.E. 803(24) 
The videotaped statements of Ms. Marshall were not admissible under I.R.E. 
803(24) as they did not contain the circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness 
necessary to be admissible under the residual hearsay exception. 
states: 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 803(24 ), the residual, or "catch-all" hearsay exception 
A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions 
but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the 
court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a 
material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for which it 
is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure 
through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules 
and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the 
statement into evidence. 
I.R.E. 803(24 ). Unlike the hearsay exceptions contained in I.R.E. 803(1 )-(4), the 
residual hearsay exception is not a firmly rooted hearsay exception for Confrontation 
Clause purposes. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 817 (1990) (recognizing that 
statements admitted under a "firmly rooted" hearsay exception are trustworthy such that 
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adversarial testing would not substantially impact their reliability). In Idaho v. Wright, 
the United States Supreme Court determined that hearsay permitted pursuant to I.R. 
803(24) must be proven to have particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. 497 U.S. 
at 821. The Court held that the spontaneity of the statement, the consistency of 
repetition, the mental state of the declarant and the lack of motive to fabricate were 
several indicators of trustworthiness. Id. at 821-22. Further, trustworthiness must be 
shown from the totality of the circumstances that surround the making of the statement. 
Id. at 819. 
In State v. Hester, 114 Idaho 688 (1988), the Idaho Supreme Court held that the 
admissibility of hearsay statement pursuant to I.R.E. 803(24) depends on the 
"trustworthiness of the evidence and the necessity for its use." Hester, 114 Idaho at 
696. 
At the hearing on the State's motion in limine, the State went through the factors 
of the residual or "catch-all" hearsay exception, in seeking to admit the videotaped 
statements of Ms. Marshall. (Trial Tr., p.94, L.12 - p.97, L.23.) However, it is clear that 
Ms. Marshall's statements were not admissible under this rule. 
First, the requisite guarantees of trustworthiness were not present when 
Ms. Marshall made the videotaped hearsay statements. As discussed in subsection 1, 
the statements were not made spontaneously, but were made in response to the 
questions of a police officer. Further, during the videotaped interview, Ms. Marshall 
asked that Mr. Phelps be arrested and taken to jail, thus indicating her anger with 
Mr. Phelps and her motive for fabrication. 
Second, the best evidence on this issue was through Ms. Marshall's trial 
testimony. There was no need to introduce these cumulative hearsay statements where 
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Ms. Marshall was available (and did) to testify at trial. The State claimed that the 
videotaped hearsay statements would show Ms. Marshall's condition after the incident, 
however, photographs of Ms. Marshall had already been admitted, and Ms. Marshall 
had testified as to her emotional and physical condition. (Trial Tr., p.95, L.22 - p.96, 
L.7, p.143, L.8- p.161, L.18.) The statements are not more probative on the point for 
which they were offered than could be procured through other means, because 
Ms. Marshall could simply have been (and was) asked about what happened when she 
testified at trial. Thus, the videotaped statements were cumulative of Ms. Marshall's 
testimony and the photographs of Ms. Marshall's injuries. 
The district court erred by holding that the statements contained in the videotape 
could be admitted at trial under hearsay exceptions I.R.E. 803(1 )-(4 ). Further, the 
statements do not meet the requirements of I.R.E. 803(24) because they do not contain 
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness. Mr. Phelps respectfully requests that this 
Court vacate the judgment of conviction, and remand this matter to the district court for 
a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Phelps respectfully requests that this Court 
vacate the judgment of conviction, and remand this matter to the district court for a new 
trial. 
DATED this 9th day of September, 2014. 
SALLY. COOLEY 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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